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NOTES
Damned if You Do ... The Supreme Court Denies Qualified
Immunity to Section 1983 Private Party Defendants in Wyatt v.
Cole
According to a well-known maxim, ignorance of a la.w is no excuse
to liability for a violation of that law.1 The requirement that citizens be
held responsible for their transgressions of the law is necessary for the
effectiveness and consistency of our legal system. The practical result in
a heavily legislated society, however, is that one faces numerous behav-
ioral restrictions and potential liabilities. It would therefore seem just
and logical to hold that one should not be held liable for following a
course of conduct explicitly prescribed by statute.' In 198 1, however, the
United States Supreme Court held that a private citizen could be liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' for invoking a state attachment statute, if that
1. The Latin is ignorantia legis neminem excusat. See LATIN WORDS & PHRASES FOR
LAWYERs 110 (R.S. Vasan ed., 1980). Other formulations of this truism include: "Ignorance
of the law excuses no man; not that all men know the law, but because 'tis an excuse every man
will plead, and no man can tell how to confute him," QuoTE IT! MEMORABLE LEGAL QuO-
TATIONS 262 (Eugene C. Gerhart ed., 1969) (quoting JOHN SELDON, THE TABLE TALK OF
JOHN SELDON 99 (Samuel H. Reynolds ed., 1892)), and "[L]awyers are the only persons in
whom ignorance of the law is not punished." Wolfe D. Goodman, Q.C., Sole Practice, Part-
nership or Merger, 9 CAN. B.J. 195, 195 (1966).
2. It is true that one will not be held accountable under the criminal law for statutorily
prescribed activity should that activity later be deemed improper. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3
("No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."); U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
("No State shall... pass any bill of attainder [or] ax post facto law."). The constitutional
guarantee that a citizen will be free from expostfacto determinations of criminal behavior does
not apply, however, to the civil law, unless the civil statute is clearly penal rather than com-
pensatory in nature. See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) ("The mark of an ex
post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated punishment for past acts.");
Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878) ("[The ax post facto effect of a law cannot be
evaded by giving a civil form to that which is essentially criminal."); Louis Vuitton S.A. v.
Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F.2d 966, 972 (2d Cir. 1985) (contrasting "potential ex post facto
problem" of treble punitive damages provision "intended to penalize" with former, constitu-
tionally valid provision "intended only to compensate victims").
3. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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statute was later held unconstitutional.' Recognizing the possible injus-
tice in holding a private party accountable for the mistakes of a legisla-
ture, the Supreme Court suggested, but did not decide, that a citizen
invoking such a law would be entitled to a good-faith immunity or de-
fense.' The decision left to individual federal courts the task of interpret-
ing private defendants' rights under § 1983.
Eleven years later in Wyatt v. Cole,6 the Supreme Court set out to
resolve the resulting conflict among the circuits7 and rejected qualified
immunity for private defendants who reasonably rely upon a valid state
replevin or attachment statute.' Restricting its inquiry to the issue of
objective qualified immunity, the Court did not otherwise rule on the
relevance of subjective good faith or objective reasonableness to the cause
of action.9 As a result, the Wyatt Court left undetermined an essential
element of a § 1983 claim against a private defendant who relies upon an
unconstitutional statutory procedure, thereby perpetuating an inconsis-
tent circuit-by-circuit interpretation of an important statute.
This Note recounts the Court's holding in Wyatt, emphasizing the
distinctions between the majority and concurring opinions. 10 The Note
then examines the developments of private party liability and qualified
immunity for public officials under § 1983, focusing on the impact of
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company on private defendants and the dra-
matic shift in the doctrine of qualified immunity effectuated by the Court
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.1 Additionally, the Note critiques the Court's
4. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982). For a discussion of
Lugar, see infra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
5. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23. The Court's implied distinction between an immunity
and a defense is misleading. Qualified immunity is defined as an "[a]ffirmative defense which
shields public officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 752 (6th ed. 1990). The Court has recognized the lack of substantive distinction
between the two, stating that "qualified immunity is a defense, [and] the burden of pleading it
rests with the defendant." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (emphasis added). An
affirmative defense, unlike a denial, is a "matter asserted by defendant which, assuming the
[plaintiff's] complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra, at 60. Examples of other affirmative defenses include assumption of risk, accord and
satisfaction, contributory negligence, and estoppel. Id. Immunity differs conceptually from
other affirmative defenses in that a party claiming immunity acknowledges his wrongful con-
duct, but asserts that he is not responsible for compensating the injured party. See infra notes
48, 159 and accompanying text. Procedurally and substantively, however, qualified immunity
is indistinguishable from any other affirmative defense.
6. 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
7. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of
qualified immunity under § 1983, see infra notes 98-122 and accompanying text.
8. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829.
9. Id. at 1834.
10. See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
11. 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see infra notes 55-126 and accompanying text.
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immunity analysis in Wyatt, questioning in particular the Court's failure
to assess the significance of its historical inquiry.12 The Note agrees with
the concurrence that, although the majority correctly applied precedent
to decide the narrow question ruled upon, it failed to address the under-
lying issues of the case or to resolve the split among the circuit courts.13
Finally, this Note recommends, based upon both the history and policy
tests traditionally employed by the Court, that private parties be granted
common-law good-faith immunity when invoking a valid state statute.14
In July 1986, Bill Cole and Howard Wyatt had a disagreement
about their business partnership.15 Cole wanted to dissolve the partner-
ship, but the two parties could not agree on terms.'6 Seeking to recover a
share of the partnership property, Cole employed an attorney, John Rob-
bins, II, who filed an action in replevin 7 in Mississippi state court. 18
Cole posted a bond and received a writ of replevin, 19 which he presented
to the court.20 As required under the existing Mississippi statute,2' the
judge then signed an execution order, instructing the sheriff to take from
Wyatt "[twenty-four] head of cattle, a tractor and certain other personal
property" and deliver the same to Cole.22 In July 1987, Wyatt filed a
§ 1983 action against Cole and Robbins in federal court,23 charging that
the Mississippi replevin statute was unconstitutional.24 The district court
12. See infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
15. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829.
16. Id.
17. "An action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels
may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken or who
wrongfully detains such goods or chattels." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY, supra note 5, at
1299.
18. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829.
19. "A provisional remedy that is an incident of a replevin action which allows the plain-
tiff at any time before judgment to take the disputed property from the defendant and hold the
property pendente lite." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1299.
20. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829.
21. The Mississippi replevin statute provided that if a party posted a bond and filed an
oath claiming ownership of property wrongfully detained by another, upon presentment of the
declaration to a judge, "such judge shall issue an order directing the clerk of such court to
issue a writ of replevin for the seizure of the property described in said declaration." MIss.
CODE ANN. § 11-37-101 (Supp. 1988) (amended 1990) (emphasis added).
22. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829.
23. Id. Wyatt also named as defendants the sheriff and deputies who enforced the re-
plevin order. The district court dismissed these claims, holding that, as public officials, the
sheriff and deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. Wyatt later named Mississippi's
Attorney General a defendant in his official capacity as a representative of the state. Wyatt v.
Cole, 928 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
24. Wyatt, 928 F.2d at 720.
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issued two separate memorandum opinions. The first found the statutory
procedure constitutionally infirm and violative of Wyatt's right to due
25process. The second opinion held that Cole and Robbins, like public
officials, were protected by qualified immunity under § 1983 for liability
based upon actions taken before the statute was found unconstitutional.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the private defendants' right to assert qualified immunity.27 In granting
immunity, the court relied on the reasoning of an earlier Fifth Circuit
opinion that awarded qualified immunity to a § 1983 private party de-
fendant.2" In his appeal, Wyatt argued that the defendants' use of the
statute was unreasonable because the Fifth Circuit had recently invali-
dated a similar Georgia statute in Johnson v. American Credit Co.29 The
25. Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (finding that the statute as
written gave "no discretion to the judge to deny a writ of replevin on presentment of a com-
plaint in the statutory form"), aft'd, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 112 S.
Ct. 1827 (1992).
26. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829 (citing Wyatt, No. 17 App. 18 (S.D. Miss. April 13, 1989)).
27. Wyatt, 928 F.2d at 721-22.
28. The court of appeals adopted the rationale developed in Folsom Investment Co. v.
Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982), which established that "a § 1983 defendant who has
invoked an attachment statute is entitled to an immunity from monetary liability so long as he
neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the statute was unconstitutional." Wy-
att, 928 F.2d at 721-22 (quoting Folsom, 681 F.2d at 1037).
The Folsom court offered a two-step justification for the immunity. First, it pointed out
that the most closely analogous common law torts-malicious prosecution and abuse of pro-
cess-afforded the defendant a defense of good faith and probable cause. In fact, the defense of
good faith and probable cause is implicit in the elements of these causes of action. To sustain
an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the defendant, without probable
cause and with malice, initiated (and lost) a civil action against the plaintiff. W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 889-95 (5th ed. 1984).
While the malice requirement of the tort action is less strict than in criminal law, the plaintiff
must show that defendant had an "improper purpose" in bringing the suit. Id. at 895. Abuse
of process, by contrast, exists where a party initiates "a legal procedure ... in proper form,
with probable cause, and even with ultimate success, but nevertheless has [done so] ... to
accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed." Id. § 121, at 897. Thus, the
necessity of an "ulterior purpose" provides a bad-faith requirement for a finding of abuse of
process and, by definition, creates a defense of good faith to the action.
In the second step of its analysis, the Folsom court reasoned that because these analogous
torts allowed a good-faith defense at common law, "Congress in enacting § 1983 could not
have intended to subject to liability those who in good faith resorted to legal process. We have
merely transformed a common law defense extant at the time of § 1983's passage into an
immunity." Folsom, 681 F.2d at 1038. A further and "most important" justification for the
immunity, the court of appeals explained, was that public policy favored allowing citizens
recourse to legally sanctioned methods of dispute resolution without fear of monetary liability
should that method later be held unconstitutional. Id. at 1038. The court concluded by noting
that where a defendant merely invokes a statute, the defendant's "role in any unconstitutional
action is marginal." Id. at 1037.
29. 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978).
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court disagreed, holding that private citizens are not as accountable for
recognizing unconstitutional law or action as are public officials:
We need not conclude that a private actor is entitled to rely on
any statutory relic, regardless of its current absurdity, in order
to conclude that Cole and Robbins, as non-governmental ac-
tors, were entitled to rely on [the replevin statute] until the dis-
trict court declared it unconstitutional. Rather, we say only
that liability on these facts would undercut the purpose of the
immunity, promoting lawfulness by allowing citizens the rea-
sonable sanctuary of the law. It is true that the statutory
scheme was in legal jeopardy. It is also true that Cole and Rob-
bins acted with the assistance of government officials who were
giving full force and effect to the statutory procedure. The
presence of these officials contributed to the reasonableness of
the private actors' conformity to the statutory procedures. In
sum, the question is close, but on balance we are persuaded that
reliance upon the statute by the private parties was not an act
of unreasonable ignorance .... When the legislature has not
repealed, and executive and judicial officials are still enforcing a
statute, it is not unreasonable for private actors to fail to
quickly comprehend a developing body of doctrine that
portends trouble for its constitutionality.30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3' and reversed.
Writing for a majority of the Court,32 Justice O'Connor initially
noted that in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,33 the case that first estab-
lished § 1983 liability for private parties utilizing a valid, but constitu-
tionally infirm, state attachment statute, the Court had explicitly "left
open" the issue of immunity.34 The majority acknowledged further that
the Court's eleven-year reticence on the question had engendered a three-
way split of opinion among the federal circuits.35
30. Wyatt, 928 F.2d at 721-22.
31. 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991).
32. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined in Justice O'Connor's
opinion. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829-34. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence, in which Justice
Scalia joined. Id. at 1834-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehmquist filed a dis-
senting opinion joined by Justices Souter and Thomas. Id. at 1837-40 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
33. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
34. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)).
It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor joined with Justices Powell and Rehnquist in
dissent in Lugar. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 944-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829-30. Justice O'Connor stated that the Fifth, Eighth, and
Eleventh circuits had granted private defendants qualified immunity when invoking a valid but
constitutionally infirm statute. Id. at 1829. She noted by contrast that the First and Ninth
Circuits had ruled against qualified immunity for private § 1983 defendants "in certain cir-
19931
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Justice O'Connor's opinion reviewed the precedential justifications
for holding Cole liable under § 1983. The majority stated that the histor-
ical purpose of § 1983 was "to deter state actors from using the badge of
their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights
and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." 36 The Court
noted that, under Lugar, a private party using an attachment, garnish-
ment, or replevin statute is acting "under color of state law" within the
contemplation of § 1983 if his taking of property from another party in-
volves conduct "fairly attributable to the State."3" Following the Lugar
analysis, Justice O'Connor accepted the district court's finding that Cole
was potentially liable under § 1983 based upon his use of the replevin
statute.38
Justice O'Connor next rejected the reasoning advanced by the court
of appeals. Although the Court agreed that the immunity analysis
should engage both historical and policy factors, the majority framed the
issue before the Court more specifically: whether private parties are to be
afforded the same qualified immunity enjoyed by public officials under
§ 1983.19 Justice O'Connor maintained that, due to unique policy con-
cerns implicated by potential tort liability for public officials, the Court
had "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at
all embodied in the common law."'' Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that fairness and policy considerations might justify extending some form
cumstances." Id at 1829-30. Finally, Justice O'Connor mentioned the Sixth Circuit, which
had adopted a good-faith defense for private defendants rather than qualified immunity. Id. at
1830.
For discussion of the federal circuit cases on this issue, see infra notes 123-26 and accom-
panying text.
36. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1830 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).
37. Id. at 1830 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). The fair attribution test involves two
inquiries:
First, the deprivation [to the plaintiffj must be caused by the [defendant's] exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.... Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.
This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the state.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. It seems clear under this test that Cole, in following a procedure
prescribed by statute and enlisting the aid of the sheriff's department, acted "under color of
state law" for the purposes of § 1983.
38. See Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1830. Because both lower courts found the parties entitled to
immunity, neither the district court nor the court of appeals determined whether Robbins was
also liable as an attorney under § 1983. Id. at 1834. In addition, the court of appeals did not
rule on Cole's liability, basing its holding instead upon a finding of immunity. Id.
39. Id. at 1834.
40. Id. at 1832 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1989)). For a discus-
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of protection to defendants "who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they
did not create,"41 but found such considerations insufficiently related to
the policy underpinnings of modem qualified immunity doctrine to war-
rant its expansion.42
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed that modem
qualified immunity should not be expanded to include private § 1983 de-
fendants,43 but he believed that the Court misdirected its focus in ad-
dressing such immunity only.44 Justice Kennedy explained that there
was no need for private party immunity once the elements of the cause of
action were defined properly.45 While Justice O'Connor fbcused on the
policy concerns unique to defendant public officials, Justice Kennedy
suggested that these concerns merely justified the Court's prior transfor-
mation of common-law defenses into an anomalous, objectively deter-
mined, immediately appealable immunity.' That this transformation of
a good-faith defense into an objectively determined immunity was inap-
propriate in the case of private parties should not end the inquiry, Justice
Kennedy maintained.47 Rather than creating an immunity from suit for
private defendants, he reasoned, the common-law analogues and public
policy compelled the Court to identify precisely what private conduct
was to be considered tortious under § 1983.48 Justice Kennedy inter-
sion of the development of qualified immunity under § 1983, see infra notes 98-122 and accom-
panying text.
41. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833.
42. Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
[P]rivate parties hold no office requiring them to exercise discretion; nor are they
principally concerned with enhancing the public good. Accordingly, extending...
qualified immunity to private parties would have no bearing on whether public offi-
cials are able to act forcefully and decisively in their jobs or on whether qualified
applicants enter public service.
Id.
43. Id. at 1834 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 1836-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1835-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 1834 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted incisively that "it is
something of a misnomer to describe the common law as creating a good faith defense; we are
in fact concerned with the essence of the wrong itself, with the essential elements of the tort."
Id. at 1835-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy pointed out the awkwardness of
using immunities to define the scope of liability:
At common law the action [for malicious prosecution and abuse of process] lay be-
cause the essence of the wrong was an injury caused by a suit or prosecution com-
menced without probable cause or with knowledge that it was baseless ....
* By casting the rule as an immunity, we imply the underlying conduct was
unlawful, a most debatable proposition in a case where a private citizen may have
acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute.
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preted common law and policy considerations to require that § 1983 lia-
bility for private parties be confined to instances in which they rely on
the constitutionality of a statute unreasonably or in bad faith.49
Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that
both history and public policy bespoke a private defendant's entitlement
to qualified immunity when invoking a valid state statute.50 The Chief
Justice noted that the Court granted many public officials qualified im-
munity based upon the availability of a good-faith defense at common
law for analogous torts.51 Concerning public policy, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist challenged what he perceived as being the majority's circular rea-
soning: because the Court had used certain public policy reasons unique
to public officials to justify immunity for those officials, only such policy
considerations would justify a finding of qualified immunity. 52 This anal-
ysis, the dissent argued, merely begged the question-"whether similar
(or even completely unrelated) reasons of public policy would warrant
immunity for private parties as well." 53 Not surprisingly, the Chief Jus-
tice found convincing the policy arguments in favor of granting immu-
nity to private defendants who rely on valid statutes to resolve property
disputes.5 4
In order to understand and evaluate the Court's analysis in Wyatt, it
is necessary to explore the modem development of both private party
liability and public official qualified immunity under § 1983. As defined
by statute, a claim of tort liability under § 1983 turns upon two elements.
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived her of a right
Id. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy suggested that objective rea-
sonableness may be irrelevant to the issue of liability, given the "support in the common law
for the proposition that a private individual's reliance on a statute, prior to a judicial determi-
nation of unconstitutionality, is considered reasonable as a matter of law." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing Birdsall v. Smith, 158 Mich. 390, 394, 122 N.W. 626, 627 (1909)). Justice
Kennedy proposed that the cause of action require the plaintiff to prove that Cole or Robbins
invoked the replevin statute unreasonably or with knowledge of its constitutional infirmity, but
that liability ultimately hinge upon a subjective test:
[Oin remand it ought to be open to [Wyatt] at least in theory to argue that the
defendant's bad faith eliminates any reliance on the statute, just as it ought to be
open to the defendant to show good faith even if some construct of a reasonable man
in the defendant's position would have acted in a different way.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1838 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41
(1986) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).
52. Id at 1839 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1839-40 (Rehnquist, C.3., dissenting); see infra note 142.
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"secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States."5 Many
constitutional rights-such as due process and equal protection--only
guarantee protection from abuses by the state and its representatives. 6
It follows, therefore, that the first element of a § 1983 action for a viola-
tion of due process contains an inherent requirement of state action. Sec-
ond, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant deprived her
of her rights while acting "under color" of state law.57 When the defend-
ant to an action under § 1983 is a public official, the dividing line be-
tween these two elements disappears;" the plaintiff is obliged to show
simply that the defendant public official violated her constitutional
rights.5 9 It is when the defendant is a private party acting in tandem
with representatives of the state that the distinction-and confusion-
arises.6°
Although the statutory scheme of § 1983 was based upon the Civil
Rights Act of 187 1,61 the Court did not recognize a cause of action
against a private party for damages thereunder until 1970 in Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co. 62 In Adickes, a restaurant denied service to a white
school teacher because she was accompanied by six black students.63
When she left the restaurant, a police officer who had followed the group
inside confronted her and arrested her for vagrancy. 6 Adickes brought
suit against Kress, the resturant owner, under § 1983, alleging that he
had conspired with the Hattiesburg police to violate her constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.65
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For the text of § 1983, see supra note 3.
56. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1981). The constitutional language
of these provisions plainly applies only to governmental violations: "No State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see supra note 3.
58. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929. This presumes that the defendant is acting in his capacity as a
public official.
59. See id. at 928 n.8.
60. See id. at 928-35.
61. I at 934.
62. 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); see Allison H. Eid, Comment, Private Party Immunities to
Section 1983 Suits, 57 U. CH. L. REv. 1323, 1329 (1990).
63. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 149.
64. Id. Adickes initially took her students to the Hattiesburg Public Library in Hatties-
burg, Mississippi. Id. The librarian would not allow the black students to use the library,
insisting that they leave. Id. When they refused, the chief of police was called, and he forced
them to exit the library. Id. Adickes and the students then entered the defendant's restaurant.
The arresting officer arrived shortly thereafter. Id.
65. Id. at 149-50. Specifically, Adickes alleged a conspiracy (1) to deny her an equal right
to be served in a "place of public accommodation," and (2) to have her arrested "on the false
charge of vagrancy." Id.
1993]
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The Adickes Court recognized § 1983's requirement of a dual show-
ing by the plaintiff of a violation and state action by the plaintiff to create
a cause of action under the statute.6 The Court found that the allega-
tions of collusion between a private party and a public official satisfied
the two-part test of § 1983.67 Addressing specifically the requirement of
state action, the Court concluded that the participation by the police in
the deprivation of plaintiff's rights brought the injury within the ambit of
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards."8 In determining whether a restau-
rant owner could be said to act "under color of law," the Court looked to
its earlier holdings69 and concluded that Kress would be accountable if
he willfully conspired with the policeman to deprive Adickes of her con-
stitutional rights. 70
The conspiracy or willfulness requirement71 necessary to hold a pri-
66. The Court stated:
First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured
by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right "under color of any stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." This second
element requires that... the defendant acted "under color of law."
Id. at 150 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (amended 1988)).
67. Id. at 152.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Court relied on two cases. In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), the
Court interpreted "under color of law" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal law equivalent
of § 1983. Id at 794 n.7. The Price Court in turn relied upon Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S, 167
(1961), which extensively examined the legislative histories of §§ 242 and 1983 and concluded
that "under color of law" was given the same meaning by Congress in both statutes. Id. at
185. Based upon reenactments of these statutes subsequent to the Court's interpreting the
phrase, the Monroe Court held that Congress used "under color of law" to denote "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law." Id at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)).
70. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152. The Court explicitly stated that § 1983 required a showing
of more than the plaintiffs acting in concert with the police. To act "under color of law," the
private party must have "reached an understanding" with the public official:
[A] private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official of the
State, can be liable under § 1983 .... "To act 'under color' of law does not require
'that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant
in the joint activity with the State or its agents."
Id (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966))."
71. Admittedly, it is difficult to appreciate how the phrase "under color of law" suggests a
conspiratorial element. The authority and legitimacy brought to bear upon citizen A by a
public official acting on behalf of, or in concert with, citizen B will leave citizen A subject to
the risks of constitutional infringements whether or not an actual conspiracy is involved. The
need for redress exists in either case because the plaintiff endured an injury that he would not
otherwise have suffered, and the defendant secured an advantage to which he was not entitled,
based upon the defendant's association with the government. If one views the law of torts not
as a vehicle through which retribution is enacted upon one party for the wrongs committed
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vate party liable under § 1983 as a joint participant with a public official
was reaffirmed by the Court in Dennis v. Sparks. 2 In Sparks, plaintiff
brought suit under § 1983 against a private party who had obtained an
injunction against him. 3 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
bribed a judge in order to obtain the injunction, which was issued in
violation of defendant's due process rights.74 The Court emphasized that
the conspiracy with the judge, not merely the plaintiff's initiating a con-
stitutionally infirm proceeding and benefitting therefrom, gave rise to the
defendant's liability under § 1983."
One year after its decision in Sparks, the Court handed down its
ruling in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,76 which eliminated the require-
ment of willfulness or conspiracy for § 1983 actions against private par-
ties who act jointly with public officials in depriving plaintiffs of
against another, but as the framework through which we apportion losses equitably, certainly
it can be argued that, as between a wrongfully injured party and the party who-albeit without
malice-caused the injury, the party who caused the injury should pay. Nevertheless, most
torts, including § 1983 torts involving public officials, require some degree of culpability, be it
intent, recklessness, or negligence.
Requiring willfulness or conspiracy for a showing of action "under color of law" can,
therefore, be justified as consistent with tort law in general. It is possible to view the function
of a § 1983 tort against private parties as redressing instances in which a private party usurps
for himself the power of governmental legitimacy, using the authority of the state to a degree
to which a citizen is not lawfully entitled or for a purpose for which it was not intended. In
such a circumstance, the public official becomes a powerful and potentially dangerous surro-
gate for the defendant. Thus, acting "under color of law" may denote the exertion of an
individual's will in the (pre-legitimated) guise of the will of the State.
72. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
73. Id. at 25. The injunction halted the plaintiff's removal of oil from certain property
pursuant to an oil lease. The injunction remained in force for two years before being quashed
by an appellate court. Id.
74. Id. at 26. The Court granted the judge absolute immunity. Id at 27. The defendant
argued unsuccessfully that because the judge was not chargeable with a § 1983 offense, the
defendant's act of conspiring with the judge could not be said to be action "under color of law"
within the meaning of the statute. Id
75. Id. at 28-29. The Court stated:
[Mierely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not
make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge. But here the allega-
tions were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt
conspiracy involving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private par-
ties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law.., within the
meaning of § 1983 as it has been construed in our prior cases.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
76. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). For contemporaneous assessments of the Lugar decision, see
Rowland L. Young, Supreme Court Report, 68 A.B.A. J. 1659, 1659-60 (1982) (summarizing
Court's formulation of state action and color of law analysis), and Rowland L. Young, The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1, 241-46 (1982) (proposing that the Lugar
Court narrowed, rather than expanded, § 1983 liability for private parties by requiring that the
public official who acts jointly with the private party defendant act in accordance with a state
policy).
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constitutionally protected rights. 7 The Court recast private defendant
liability in the context of a statutory attachment procedure 8.7  Edmond-
son filed suit in state court to collect certain debts owed by Lugar and
also requested a prejudgment attachment of Lugar's property. 9 Virginia
law required only that Edmondson file a petition indicating his concern
that Lugar might dispose of the property in order to render himself judg-
ment proof.80 Based upon the petition, a court clerk issued a writ, and
the sheriff enforced it."' More than a month later, the attachment order
was dismissed at a postseizure hearing. Lugar then sued under § 1983,
on the theory that Edmondson "acted jointly with the State to deprive
him of his property without due process of law."82
The Court removed the conspiracy requirement for joint actors by
eliminating the two-prong test for liability under § 1983.83 The Court's
reasoning was simple. Prior case law indicated that a plaintiff could
challenge the constitutionality of an attachment statute in an action
brought solely against a private defendant;84 because the Constitution
77. The Court stated specifically, "The Court of Appeals erred in holding that in this
context 'joint participation' required something more than invoking the aid of state officials to
take advantage of state-created attachment procedures." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
78. Id at 924. The Court apparently limited its holding to such statutes without offering




82. Id. at 925.
83. Id. at 932 & n.15. For a catalog of important case law prior to Lugar developing the
separate state action and "under color of law" requirements, see Pamela C. Walker, Color of
State Law and State Action: What are They and What is their Relationship?, in RECENT DE-
VELOPMENTS IN SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 391, 391-405 (George C. Pratt et
al. eds., 1984).
84. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 927. The Lugar Court cited several cases to support this conten-
tion: North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). None of the cited cases involved the issue of monetary tort liabil-
ity for private defendants based upon the unconstitutionality of a statutory procedure. More-
over, of these cases, only Fuentes was an action under § 1983.
Margarita Fuentes purchased a stove and stereo from Firestone under an installment sales
contract. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70. With $200 due on the contract, Fuentes and Firestone
became embroiled in a dispute regarding Firestone's obligation to service the stove. Firestone
sued to repossess the merchandise. Id. Firestone received a writ of replevin requiring the
sheriff to seize the property. Id. To obtain the writ under Florida law, "Firestone had only to
fill in the blanks on the appropriate form documents and submit them to the clerk of the small
claims court." Id at 70-71.
Two elements of Fuentes call the Court's reasoning into question. First, Fuentes brought
suit against both the state Attorney General and a private citizen under § 1983. More signifi-
cantly, although she invoked jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1983, Fuentes sought
only declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to invalidate the statutory prejudgment replevin
procedures. Id at 71 & n.3.
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protects parties only against governmental violations of constitutional
rights, it necessarily follows that, if a defendant's use of a statute is found
unconstitutional, the defendant's invocation of that statute constitutes a
state action. 5 According to the Court, given that the purpose of § 1983
is to vindicate fully the plaintiff's constitutional rights, "under color of
law" could not have been intended to restrict the applicability of § 1983
once a constitutional deprivation was found.86 Thus, whenever a private
party invokes an attachment or replevin statute and obtains enforcement
thereof from a public official, he participates in state action and acts
"under color of" the statute relied upon.8 7
85. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 933.
86. Id. at 934.
87. Id. The Court concluded that no distinction existed between "state action" and action
"under color of law" under § 1983. Id. at 935. The Court found no historical justification for
the theory that Congress intended "under color of law" to limit the scope of § 1983's reach.
Indeed, the Court found that "[t]he history of [§ 1983] is replete with statements indicating
that Congress thought it was creating a remedy as broad as the protection that the Fourteenth
Amendment affords the individual." Id. Therefore, Justice White, writing for the majority,
reasoned that the ability of a plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or proce-
dure in an action against a private defendant delimited the reach of that defendant's liability
under § 1983:
If a defendant debtor in state-court debt collection proceedings can successfully chal-
lenge, on federal due process grounds, the plaintiff creditor's resort to the procedures
authorized by a state statute, it is difficult to understand why that same behavior by
the state-court plaintiff should not provide a cause of action under § 1983. If the
creditor-plaintiff violates the debtor-defendant's due process rights by seizing his
property in accordance with statutory procedures, there is little or no reason to deny
to the latter a cause of action under the federal statute, § 1983, designed to provide
judicial redress for just such constitutional violations.
Id. at 934.
Such an analysis turns the Adickes and Sparks conceptualization of private party liability
on its head. Whereas, under a conspiracy requirement a defendant is liable for intentionally
using a governmental agent to do his bidding upon an unsuspecting plaintiff, under Lugar,
liability is thrust upon the unsuspecting private party defendant by the government, which
induces the private party to activate its preordained, unconstitutional procedures. As men-
tioned previously, however, this criticism assumes that culpability is relevant to a finding of
§ 1983 liability. See discussion supra note 71.
There is a more fundamental problem with the Court's reasoning. Even though the plain-
tiff's contesting of the constitutionality of a statutory procedure may occur in the context of an
action against the private party defendant, it does not necessarily follow that the private de-
fendant's actions are at issue. What is being challenged is the action of the legislature in
passing an unconstitutional statute, or the action of an executive officer in enforcing a statute
in an unconstitutional manner. To view the defendant's behavior as being on trial is unsound.
As Justice White recognized, "While private misuse of a state statute does not describe con-
duct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously
is the product of state action." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 (emphasis added). During any legal
proceeding the constitutionality of the legal system and its procedures as applied to the parties
may be said to be on trial. It is another matter entirely to claim that a private citizen is
somehow responsible for the legal system upon which she relies.
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In merging "under color of law" into the requirement of state ac-
tion, the Lugar Court reduced the analysis for § 1983 liability to whether
a constitutional violation has in fact occurred. Under Lugar, a plaintiff
need only show that the "conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a
federal right be fairly attributable to the State." ' In a somewhat revi-
sionist evocation of Adickes, Justice White, writing for the majority in
Lugar, relied upon this earlier holding to support a finding of § 1983
liability where the plaintiff obtained assistance from the clerk of court
and the sheriff in executing and enforcing the attachment order.8 9
Two dissenting Justices decried the Lugar holding. According to
then Chief Justice Burger, by misreading the "under color of law" re-
quirement, the Court had erased the distinction between private and pub-
lic behavior, conflating the private action of filing a lawsuit with the
subsequent conduct of the State.9 0 Relying on Dennis v. Sparks,91 Chief
Justice Burger maintained, "Invoking a judicial process, of course, impli-
cates the State and its officers but does not transform essentially private
88. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. For a discussion of the fair attribution test, see supra note 37.
This test ensures only that the injurious conduct involved is properly described as state action,
which by definition is a requirement for showing a due process violation. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.").
89. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941. Justice White apparently interpreted Adickes so that the con-
spiratorial element was not central to the holding. Although quoting the language of Adickes
requiring "willful participa[tion]" by the private party, he seemed to construe "willful" as
denoting something akin to the element of general intent in an intentional tort. "Willfulness"
in its legal sense signifies "the specific intent to do something the law forbids," and in the tort
context indicates "intent or purpose to injure." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at
1599-1600. By contrast, just as an action in trespass requires a finding merely that the defend-
ant intended to come onto the property in question (even if he believed it to be his own), so
Justice White construed Adickes to require merely that a defendant intentionally resorted to a
statutory remedy:
[W]e have consistently held that a private party's joint participation with state offi-
cials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a
state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment .... The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that in this context 'joint participation" required something more
than invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created attachment
procedures .... Whatever may be true in other contexts, this is sufficient when the
State has created a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte
application of one party to a private dispute.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42. Responding to the dissent's claim that the Court's holding would
render private parties liable under § 1983 for invoking any state procedure which resulted in a
constitutional violation (for example, if plaintiff invoked and subsequently gained personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident by means of a constitutionally infirm long-arm statute, or if de-
fendant sought the aid of a police officer, who subsequently arrested plaintiff without cause),
Justice White somewhat arbitrarily "limited [the holding] to the particular context of prejudg-
ment attachment." Id. at 939 n.21.
90. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 943 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
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conduct into actions of the State." 92 Justice Powell9" also criticized the
Court's abandonment of a separate "under color of law" requirement.94
While agreeing that a showing of "joint participation" under Adickes
provided the requisite showing for liability, Justice Powell insisted that
Adickes demanded a finding of a private party conspiracy95 with a state
officer before § 1983 liability would lie. 6
92. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 943 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion. ri at 944 (Powell,
J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor, the author of the majority opin-
ion in Wyatt, originally argued against finding any liability under § 1983 for a private party
who invokes a presumptively valid state statute. In fact, it was the Lugar majority's response
to the concerns raised in Justice Powell's dissent that set the stage for Wyatt:
Justice Powell is concerned that private individuals who innocently make use of
seemingly valid state laws would be responsible, if the law is subsequently held to be
unconstitutional, for the consequences- of their actions. In our view, however, this
problem should be dealt with not by changing the character of the cause of action but
by establishing an affirmative defense. A similar concern is at least partially responsi-
ble for the availability of a good-faith defense, or qualified immunity, to state officials.
We need not reach the question of the availability of such a defense to private indi-
viduals at this juncture.
Id. at 942 n.23.
94. Id. at 947-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, like Chief Justice Burger, be-
lieved that the case involved two distinct sets of acts-the purely private acts of filing a lawsuit
and attachment petition, and the public acts of the sheriff and clerk of court. Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Because the private party was not a state actor, he could be found liable only upon
a showing that he acted under color of law. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
95. Such a finding is apparently still required by the Court outside the context of attach-
ment, garnishment, or replevin procedures. In NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), the
Court rejected the argument by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) basketball
coach that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private party, had acted
jointly with the state university officials who suspended him from coaching in violation of his
due process rights. Id. at 196 & n.16. The NCAA conducted hearings and investigations and
established the rules upon which UNLV based its decision to suspend Tarlanian. Id. at 183-
86. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the use of these hiarings as grounds for a suspen-
sion did not afford Tarkanian procedural due process. Id. at 189. Moreover, it was the
NCAA who called for Tarkanian's suspension; UNLV acquiesced pursuant to its membership
agreement with the NCAA. Id. at 186-87. Despite finding constitutional violations, the
Supreme Court found no joint participation, basing its holding on the absence of an unlawful
conspiracy:
In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). ... the allegations were that an official act of
the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy .... Under these allega-
tions, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state
law. In this case there is no suggestion of any impropriety respecting the agreement
between the NCAA and UNLV.
Id. at 197 n.17 (citing Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28).
96. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 954-55 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued:
Adickes establishes that a private party acts under color of law when he conspires
with state officials to secure the application of a state law so plainly unconstitutional
as to enjoy no presumption of validity. In such a context, the private party could be
characterized as hiding behind the authority of law and as engaging in "joint partici-
pation" with the State in the deprivation of constitutional rights. Here, however,
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By removing the requirement of conspiratorial intent for a finding of
joint participation under § 1983, the holding in Lugar created the poten-
tial for private parties to be held liable for using statutory procedures
reasonably and in good faith.97 In the span of a decade, the court had
transformed § 1983 from a statute that addressed only the actions of
state officials into a scheme imposing liability on private parties who rely
upon the procedures created by the state. Whereas the private party's
culpability in using state power was central to a finding of liability under
Adickes and Sparks, Lugar called into question the relevance of such cul-
pability to a § 1983 tort, and with it the very contours of the tort. Thus,
Lugar announced a revolution in the § 1983 action against private de-
fendants, but left important aspects of the new tort undetermined.
The development of qualified immunity9" under § 1983 occurred in
the context of the liability of public officials. In creating immunities, the
Court attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the competing
policy goals of protecting constitutional rights and allowing for the inevi-
table mistakes made by human agents carrying out governmental func-
tions in the absence of clearly delineated constitutional ground rules.99
Since tensions similar to those created by § 1983 were present in the
common law, the Court looked to the common law to fashion immunities
petitioner has alleged no conspiracy. Nor has he even alleged that respondent was
invoking the aid of a law he should have known to be constitutionally invalid.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. See supra note 93. As scholars have noted, there is no apparent principled basis for
confining Lugar to attachment proceedings. See, ag., MARIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E.
KIRKLiN, SEcTIoN 1983 LrmGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES § 5.13, at 110-11 (1986)
("It is unclear, however, why Lugar should not apply to the invocation of legal procedures
other than prejudgment attachment that require the participation of public officials for their
enforcement.").
98. The common law distinguished qualified immunity from absolute immunity in both
purpose and procedural effect. Qualified immunity, which was typically enjoyed by low-level
public officials, ensured that those who acted in good faith would not be held monetarily liable
for errors they made in carrying out their official duties. Laura Oren, Immunity and.Accounta-
bility in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. Pri. L. REv. 935, 944-45 (1989).
Procedurally, qualified immunity was a good-faith defense which the defendant official had the
burden of pleading. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Implicit in this formulation
was the requirement that the official demonstrate to a court or jury that he acted in good faith
before the immunity would be triggered. By contrast, the doctrine of absolute immunity be-
stowed complete protection from suit; it was crafted to protect officials whose duties included
wide-ranging discretionary activity and required freedom from distractions. Oren, supra, at
944. The policy justification for complete immunity to suit is the belief that "certain officials
could not perform their special functions unless they were insulated from litigation itself. In
this narrow category, the public interest justified the loss of the individual's remedy." Id. at
976 (emphasis added).
99. See Oren, supra note 98, at 942-43 (discussing the importation of common-law con-
cepts of immunity into civil rights law based upon similarities of policy concerns).
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under the civil rights statutes."co
The Court first found a good-faith immunity for public officials
under § 1983 in Pierson v. Ray. 01 Pierson involved an arrest made by a
police officer pursuant to a state statute that was later found unconstitu-
tional.'02 The defendant averred that he acted in good-faith reliance on
the validity of the statute and with probable cause to believe that the
statute had been violated.'03 The Court thus confronted. the issue of
whether § 1983, which did not explicitly confer any defenses or immuni-
ties to liability,1' 4 allowed the police to exercise their duties in good faith
without fear of incurring monetary damages.' 05 In a critical determina-
tion, the Court decided that Congress drafted § 1983 mindful of immuni-
ties and defenses as they then existed under the common law.106 In light
of its original interpretation of § 1983,107 the Court looked to the com-
100. Id. The common law responded to this give and take between protecting citizens from
governmental abuses and allowing the government to perform its functions expeditiously by
creating grades of immunity based on the functions performed by the public official in ques-
tion. Id. at 943-44.
101. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
102. Id at 549-50.
103. Id. at 555.
104. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1975).
105. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 551-52.
106. Id. at 554-55. The Court suggested that the common-law immunities were well-estab-
lished, reasoned responses to the significant policy concerns surrounding the actions of public
officials. Id at 555. In interpreting § 1983, it was necessary to read Congress's intent as either
abrogating all immunities under the common law, or incorporating them into the statutory
tort scheme. The Court concluded that Congress meant to preserve the common-law
framework:
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which
makes liable "every person" who under color of law deprives another person of his
civil rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to
abolish wholesale all common-law immunities .... [We presume that Congress
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.
Id. at 554-55. Besides upholding the good-faith immunity of police officers, the Court recog-
nized the absolute immunity from civil liability of judges acting within the scope of their office.
Id. at 554.
107. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judi-
cial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PENN. L. REv. 23, 35-37
(1989). Professor Rudovsky criticizes the full-scale reenactment of common-law immunities
after § 1983's enactment as undermining the obvious purpose of Congress in passing the stat-
ute, He finds no support in the Constitution or the statute for the blanket immunities afforded
public officials under § 1983, attributing them instead to "the Court's own policy judgment
that an individual's right to compensation for constitutional violations and the deterrence of
unconstitutional conduct should be subordinated to the governmental interest in effective and
vigorous execution of governmental policies and programs." Id. at 36.
Regardless of how one views the desirability of immunities under remedial civil rights
statutes, after Pierson, the Lugar Court's assertion that Congress intended § 1983 to afford
relief to the full extent provided by the Constitution is directly contradicted by the existence of
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mon law of torts of 1871, the year in which Congress enacted the histori-
cal antecedent of § 1983. Based upon the common-law defense to the
tort of false arrest, the Court stated that the police officer should be held
immune from § 1983 liability if he acted in good faith and with probable
cause. 108
The Court subsequently expanded qualified immunity under § 1983
to benefit other public officials1°9 and refined the requirement for a find-
ing of immunity into a clear, two-pronged test. 110 Such a standard, the
Court reasoned, best balanced all competing policy interests represented
within the objectives of § 1983.11 The Court specifically cautioned
against further encroachment upon a civil rights plaintiff's opportunity
for a statutory remedy. Justice White, writing for the majority in Wood
v. Strickland,112 held that this dual inquiry based on objective reasonable-
ness and subjective good faith was the minimally acceptable test for
awarding immunity. "Any lesser standard," Justice White believed,
"would deny much of the promise of § 1983."113
immunities. Pierson and its progeny establish that Congress intended to limit monetary liabil-
ity under the statute in light of common-law defenses and immunities. The Court held as early
as Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that § 1983 "should be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Id.
at 187. As the Pierson Court noted, "Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of
police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause." Pierson, 368
U.S. at 556-57.
108. Pierson, 368 U.S. at 557.
109. See, eg., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (holding Superintendent of Police
immune); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (granting immunity to high school admin-
istrators); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (holding immune from liability Ohio Gover-
nor, Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, and the President of Kent State
University). But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (denying immu-
nity to municipality due to Court's finding of "no [common-law] tradition of immunity for
municipal corporations").
110. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 635; Wood, 420 U.S. at 321; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48 ("It
is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with the good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.").
The Wood Court's opinion firmly established the nature of the two-prong test:
The disagreement... over the immunity standard in this case has been put in terms
of an "objective" versus a "subjective" test of good faith. As we see it, the appropri-
ate standard necessarily contains elements of both. The official himself must be act-
ing sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right, but an act violating ...
constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled,
indisputable law ... than by the presence of actual malice.
Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
111. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
112. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
113. Id. at 322.
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In Harlow v. Fitzgerald"4 the Court "completely reformulated qual-
ified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common
law,""' 5 abrogating the subjective good-faith requirement for official im-
munity under § 1983.116 Under Harlow, a public official is immune from
suit if his conduct is adjudged reasonable "as measured by reference to
clearly established law.""17 Good faith is simply not an issue."" The
Court found convincing the defendants' argument that the public policy
concerns justifying qualified immunity for public officials require a stan-
dard of immunity that would assure dismissal of groundless suits before
permitting discovery and without resort to trial." 9 The Court argued
114. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald alleged that senior White House
aides in the Nixon administration conspired to terminate his employment at the Department of
the Air Force because he threatened to expose abuses in procurement by the Department. Id.
at 802, 804. Fitzgerald brought a civil action pursuant to the First Amendment and two fed-
eral statutes. Id. at 805 & n.10. The aides, Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, argued
that they were entitled to absolute immunity from suit "as an incident to their offices as Presi-
dential aides." Id at 808. In the alternative, they requested and were granted "an application
of the qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims with-
out resort to trial." Id. at 813. To ensure pre-trial dismissal of weak claims, the Court jet-
tisoned the requirement of subjective good faith from public-official qualified immunity. Id at
817-19.
115. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). Prior to Harlow, of course, the
Court had modified and expanded common-law immunities somewhat in order to protect a
wide array of pubic actors. The most significant change before Harlow, however, consisted of
the elimination of degrees of qualified immunity according to the amount of discretionary
power afforded different officials. As Justice Scalia observed, "[W]e have been unwilling to
complicate qualified immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity turn on the
precise nature of various officials' duties or the precise character of the particular rights alleged
to have been violated." Id at 643.
116. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
117. Id. at 818. Harlow actually goes further, providing an immunity to a public official
who violates clearly established constitutional standards if he can show "extraordinary circum-
stances" which justify his ignorance of the law. Id. at 819. This test, too, would be measured
by an objective standard. Id
118. Justice Brennan read the case as imposing liability when an official acts reasonably,
but in bad faith. "This standard," he concluded, "would not allow the official who actually
knows that he was violating the law to escape liability." Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
This reading is not based in the language of the Court's holding. The Court explicitly rejected
the inclusion of a subjective element on the grounds that its inclusion would frustrate the
purpose of the immunity: "Judicial inquiry into the subjective motivation ... may entail
broad-ranging discovery .... Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government." Id. at 817 (footnote omitted). Subsequent case law has affirmed the Court's
intent to abandon the subjective inquiry of qualified immunity for public officials under § 1983.
See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (observing that "tt]his does not reintroduce into qualified
immunity analysis the inquiry into subjective intent that Harlow sought to minimize"); Mitch-
ell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517 (1984) (noting that Harlow "purged qualified immunity doc-
trine of its subjective components").
119. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813. The Court reasoned that because the subjective test required
a factual determination into the defendant's state of mind, under the common-law formulation,
"bare allegations of malice... suffice to subject government officials ... to the costs of trial
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that the "social costs" of insubstantial civil rights claims compelled its
shift to a purely objective test, which a judge could decide as a matter of
law at summary judgment.1 20 With Mitchell v. Forsyth,12 1 in which the
Court held that a denial of qualified immunity was subject to immediate
interlocutory appeal, the Court completed the dramatic restructuring of
qualified immunity.122 This finding offered officials further protection
from discovery and trial.
In the wake of Harlow, circuit courts prior to Wyatt developed a
variety of responses to the issue of qualified immunity for private party
defendants under § 1983. The Ninth Circuit consistently held that pri-
vate parties merited no qualified immunity under § 1983.123 Several cir-
[and] the burdens of broad-reaching discovery." Id. at 817-18. One commentator maintained
that the shift made in Harlow was due at least in part to the defendants' status as high-ranking
federal officials. Oren, supra note 98, at 969-73. Harlow was a Bivens action (an action, deriv-
ing its name from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), brought
against federal officials directly under the Constitution, rather than under a remedial statute
such as § 1983) against senior White House aides who were accused of conspiring to violate
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. The Court, although recognizing
at least conceptually that "high officials require greater protection than those with less com-
plex discretionary responsibilities," id. at 807, declined to extend absolute immunity to a
broad range of executive officials. Id at 809. Because the same immunity standards apply to
federal and state officials in civil rights suits, the benefits of the "federal influence" of the
Harlow defendants on the Court's decision accrued to all public officials afforded qualified
immunity under § 1983.
In viewing qualified immunity as a means to dismiss lawsuits before trial, the Court super-
imposed the theoretical objectives, and thereby many of the benefits, of absolute immunity
onto qualified immunity: "The only difference [between Harlow qualified immunity and abso-
lute immunity] is that some possibility remained that where a constitutional right is clearly
established enough, however that may be defined, a plaintiff can proceed with the litigation."
Oren, supra note 98, at 981. For a discussion of the procedural implications of the Harlow
decision, see Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Ques-
tions, 23 GA. L. Rlv. 597, 634-42 (1989) (noting that Harlow retained the Gomez procedural
posture of requiring the defendant to bear the burden of pleading and proof).
120. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814, 818. These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will "'dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the un-
flinching discharge of their duties."' Id. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
121. 472 U.S. 511 (1984).
122. Id. at 530.
123. See, eg., Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487, 1489, 1492 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding no qualified immunity for private towing company assisting police in removing cars
pursuant to a municipal ordinance); F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1989) (denying immunity to private contractor for actions required under terms of govern-
ment contract); Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing qualified
immunity to private party who used police officer to serve eviction notice); Stypmarm v. City &
County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1341-44 (9th Cir. 1977) (denying immunity to tow-
ing company working at behest of police and under municipal ordinance).
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cuits conferred upon such defendants the objective, immediately
appealable immunity from suit created by the Court in Harlow and
Mitchell.'24 The First and Sixth Circuits applied to private § 1983 de-
fendants an immunity based upon a showing of good faith and probable
cause. 12 ' Finally, the Eighth Circuit, purporting to adopt the Harlow
immunity test but retaining the good-faith requirement, either misinter-
preted Harlow or purposefully mitigated its broad-brush immunity for
defendants whose actions, although objectively reasonable, were made in
bad faith.126
The Court's consideration of Wyatt provided an opportunity to re-
solve the conflict among the circuits and to clarify its position set out in
Lugar with respect to liability under § 1983 for private citizens who rely
on statutorily prescribed methods of recovering property from other par-
ties. Five Justices on the Court 27 explicitly stated that the holding in
Lugar should be corrected, 128 at least to the extent that it conferred lia-
bility on those invoking a statute and receiving aid from public officers
reasonably and in good faith. Moreover, the majority opinion intimated
that while the Lugar decision was at least incomplete, 2 9 the Court's
124. See Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1991) (deciding immunity as a
matter of law under Harlow), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992); Jones v. Preuit & Maulding, 851
F.2d 1321, 1323-25 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (awarding Harlow immunity to creditor in
wrongful attachment suit), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989); DeVargas v. Ma-
son & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714,717,720(10th Cir. 1988) (granting private party
complying with agency guidelines under a government contract the same immunity afforded
public officials under Harlow), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); Watertown Equip. Co. v.
Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1490, 1494 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying objective
Harlow qualified immunity test to private party, but finding party's conduct unreasonable),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1001 (1988); Shipley v. First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n., 703 F. Supp. 1122,
1125, 1134 (D. Del. 1988) (granting immunity under Harlow to mortgagor using court rule
providing constitutionally insufficient process requirements for foreclosure action), affid with-
out opinion, 877 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1990); Carman v. City of
Eden Prarie, 622 F. Supp. 963, 964-66 (D. Minn. 1985) (bestowing Harlow immunity to pri-
vate, state-licensed detoxification center working in conjunction with police and using discre-
tionary power granted by state statute).
125. See Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1262, 1267-68 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting explicitly
Harlow standard in favor of common-law qualified immunity for creditor who followed rule of
court for attachment proceedings); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 3, 11 (1st Cir. 1978) (recog-
nizing, before either Harlow or Lugar, common-law qualified immunity for doctor who per-
formed non-consensual sterilization of patient at community hospital), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
910 (1978).
126. See Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1983) (claiming a private party
entitlement to Harlow immunity when invoking state garnishment statute, but applying "knew
or should have known" standard and basing determination upon findings of fact).
127. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas argued for
some limitation of Lugar liability. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1834, 1837.
128. See id, at 1836-37 (Kennedy, J.,. concurring); id at 1839-40 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
129. Id. at 1834. Justice O'Connor observed:
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holding was limited to rejecting one inappropriate method of repair. The
five Justices willing to act could not agree on the judicial theory upon
which to base the correction. As a result, the lowest common denomina-
tor prevailed, with Wyatt establishing only that Harlow immunity did not
present the appropriate answer for the questions left open in Lugar.130
At first blush, the Court's decision is startling, given the factual and
historical similarities between the conduct in Pierson"' and that in Wy-
att. Justice O'Connor's framing of the issue in Wyatt, however, is telling:
"whether qualified immunity as enunciated in Harlow, is available for
private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state re-
plevin statute." 132  While common-law immunities afford some protec-
tions from liability, they were neither intended nor designed to
accomplish the far-reaching immunization from suit itself that Harlow
created. Harlow immunity resembles nothing so much as common-law
absolute immunity. In fact, Harlow's objective test renders moot the fac-
tual determination that defined the scope of the immunity at common
law: the defendant's subjective intent. 133 Because the Wyatt Court
grounded the radical change brought about by Harlow in modem policy
concerns rather than history,13 1 the Court had to reassess the import of
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983 liabil-
ity under Lugar... could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith
and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental,
parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens. Because these issues are
not fairly before us, however, we leave them for another day.
Id. This last statement is puzzling given that both petitioner and respondent briefed the court
on the issue of the availability of good-faith immunity under common law. See Brief for Re-
spondent at 6-8, Wyatt (No. 91-126); Brief for Petitioner at 7-9, Wyatt (No. 91-126).
130. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1834.
131. For a discussion of Pierson, see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
132. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1834 (emphasis added). In fact, the Court framed the issue in two
ways in the same paragraph. "The question on which we granted certiorari," Justice
O'Connor wrote, was "whether private persons, who conspire with state officials to violate
constitutional rights have available the good faith immunity applicable to public officials." Id.
(quoting Petition for Certiorari at i, Wyatt (No. 91-126)). Even under the loosest standards of
interpretation, this issue formulation asks two distinct questions. First, the immunity now
available to public officials can in no way be said to constitute a good-faith immunity, since the
actor's good faith is irrelevant. Second, the act of "conspirfing] with state officials" is very
different indeed from the mere "invo[cation ofJ a state replevin, garnishment or attachment
statute." Id. It is surprising that Justice O'Connor would view these two acts--conspiracy
and the invocation of a statute-as equivalents, given that she sided with the dissent in Lugar,
It is also curious that Justice O'Connor raised the possibility of a good-faith immunity in one
issue statement, but failed even to consider good-faith immunity in the opinion. Unquestiona-
bly, the Court recognized that Harlow immunity is not good-faith immunity. See id. at 1832-
33. Perhaps the Court reasoned that because, after Harlow, good-faith immunity no longer
exists under § 1983, it was forced to rephrase the issue accordingly.
133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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its inquiry into the common law.
While unwilling to state as much expressly, the Court chose to aban-
don the historical immunity test rather than expand Harlow immunity
based upon the existence of a dissimilar subjective immunity at common
law.'35 The Court created a dynamic between history and policy'36 in
which a showing of a historical entitlement to immunity served merely as
a passageway through which the party seeking immunity reached the
Court's all-determinative public policy test. The result is an all-or-noth-
ing standard, under which a defendant is granted either an immediately
appealable, objective immunity or no immunity at all. 137 Given this re-
strictive framework, the Court faced a difficult task: how to rationalize a
denial of immunity without overtly renouncing the utility of the histori-
cal test in favor of "freewheeling policy choice[s]."' 13  Justice O'Connor
recognized that a private party at common law enjoyed the same good-
faith protection from liability for initiating litigation as did the police
officer in Pierson, 39 but found this similarity "of no avail" to a party
asking for an immunity that is substantially different from that awarded
in Pierson."4° In order to deserve Harlow immunity, wrote Justice
O'Connor, Cole had to demonstrate that the "rationales mandating qual-
ified immunity for public officials are.., applicable to private parties."' 1
Justice O'Connor concluded that these rationales were not applicable to
private parties. 142
Although this dual analysis is suspect, it was necessary to stem the
further erosion of § 1983. The Court seemingly conducted its historical
analysis to lend a methodological validity to its opinion, but cast the re-
135. By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed the historical inquiry as still controlling
immunity awards under § 1983 after Harlow. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1838 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
136. Id. at 1833.
137. Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, although differing in their conclusions,
agreed in their conceptualization of the case as an all-or-nothing choice between Harlow or no
immunity. See id at 1832; id. at 1838 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
138. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
139. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1832.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1833.
142. Id. In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that denying immunity to private
parties who faced liability for relying upon a statute contained its own equally compelling
social costs:
The normal presumption that attaches to any law is that society will be benefited if
private parties rely on that law to provide them a remedy, rather than turning to
some form of private, and perhaps lawless, relief.... I would have thought it beyond
peradventure that there is a strong public interest in encouraging private citizens to
rely on valid state laws of which they have no reason to doubt the validity.
Id. at 1839-40 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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suits of this analysis as a mere remnant of the pre-Harlow dialogue be-
tween § 1983 and the common law of tort. Justice O'Connor's pithy
dismissal of the similarity between Pierson and Wydtt cleared the way for
an open-ended discussion of policy, but left unvindicated the historical
parallels between public and private qualified immunity. 43 While paying
only lip service to the common law may appear disingenuous, it is a nec-
essary result if the Court is to assess the propriety of granting a Harlow-
type immunity which has no direct parallel at common law. Rather than
proceeding with the demise of § 1983, applying Harlow qualified immu-
nity as if it were merely a modem-day equivalent of good-faith immunity,
the Wyatt Court confronted this historical anomaly head-on, thereby
halting Harlow's further encroachment into the rights of civil rights
plaintiffs.
It is difficult to evaluate the Court's weighing of various public poli-
cies in the abstract."M The theme of the Wyatt Court's policy analysis is
that private party immunity benefits the defendant primarily, while
shielding public officials with immunity presumably benefits society as a
whole (excluding, of course, those who suffer uncompensated injuries at
the hands of these officials). 45 Yet, it is clear that Justice O'Connor's
143. This inconsistency owes itself to Harlow's dramatic alteration in qualified immunity.
While ostensibly modifying history based on policy, the Harlow Court in fact substituted pol-
icy for history. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. The problem with using policy
concerns to alter fundamentally the protections afforded public officials at common law when
§ 1983 was enacted is that such an alteration is logically incompatible with the Court's own
declaration that Congress intended to limit liability according to the policy determinations
incorporated into the common law. It seems inescapable that the policy concerns the Court
used to justify the strengthening of immunities for public officials in Harlow already existed at
common law and were factored into the common law's determination of the type of immunity
appropriate for governmental actors. To assert that these same policy concerns somehow de-
mand transformation of the common law is ultimately to substitute the Court's policy choices
for those of history and of Congress, which purportedly created § 1983 intending no immuni-
ties other than those inuring to defendants at common law.
144. It proved a challenging task to the Court as well. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices Souter and Thomas believed that the policies implicated by Wyatt were sufficient to up-
hold a finding of qualified immunity underHarlow. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1839 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). At least one commentator has agreed, asserting that "[a]lthough the policy justifi-
cations underlying official immunity do not precisely mirror those underlying private immu-
nity, they do take aim at a similar target." Eid, supra note 62, at 1348. For various federal
courts' views on the relative equivalence of the policy considerations, see supra notes 123-26
and accompanying text.
145. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833. Justice O'Connor made the additional point that while a
public official committing a tortious act is pursuing public ends, a private party invoking a
replevin statute is pursuing a private goal. See id. at 1833-34. Chief Justice Rehnquist coun-
tered that there is an inherent public benefit in a citizen's use of the legal process rather than
self-help. Id at 1839 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). More fundamentally, however, the Chief
Justice questioned the fairness of the distinction between public and private objectives, given
that the private defendant is being held liable as a state actor for the purposes of the statute:
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framing of the analysis weighed against the private party defendants inas-
much as it required the defendants to demonstrate that "the special con-
cerns involved in suing government officials" also applied to private
parties. 146 Given that the Wyatt Court chose to frame the issue in terms
of defendants' entitlement to the extraordinary protection of Harlow im-
munity rather than to any immunity, however, the rigid adherence to the
Harlow standard is merited.
Rather than viewing Harlow as an exception to its traditional use of
the common law to provide immunities under § 1983, the Wyatt Court
apparently believed that Harlow completely supplanted good-faith im-
munity. Rejecting the notion of a two-tiered qualified immunity-good-
faith immunity for private parties and objectively determined immunity
for certain public officials-Justice O'Connor avoided any analysis of the
defendant's entitlement to the qualified immunity described in Pierson,
Scheuer, and Gomez by means of a semantic sleight of hand, referring to
this protection from liability as a "good-faith defense."' 4 Leaving aside
this manipulation of diction, there remains an unresolved contradiction
between the Court's unwillingness to conduct a tort-by-tort approach to
immunity standards 4 ' and its singling out, in Lugar and. Wyatt, of the
invocation of an attachment, garnishment, or replevin statute as being
uniquely devoid of a conspiracy requirement under the joint participation
doctrine of § 1983. Be that as it may, because the issue before the court
was entitlement to immunity and not to a defense, the Court failed to
consider the common-law alternative of Pierson.
While agreeing with Justice O'Connor that further proliferation of
objective qualified immunity was undesirable, Justice Kennedy differed
fundamentally from the majority in his belief that the historical inquiry
[I]t is at least passing strange to conclude that private individuals are acting "under
color of law" because they invoke a state garnishment statute and the aid of state
officers,. . . but yet deny them the immunity to which those same state officers are
entitled, simply because the private parties are not state employees.
Id. at 1840 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 1833.
147. Id. at 1832. This distinction is all but meaningless, given that qualified immunity
itself is a defense. See discussion supra note 5.
148. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). In Anderson the plaintiff as-
serted that Harlow objective immunity could not possibly apply to § 1983 actions alleging a
violation of the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
plaintiff maintained, in essence, that it was impossible reasonably to act unreasonably, and that
Harlow therefore was inapposite. Id. at 643. The Court rejected the plaintiff's call for a sepa-
rate immunity standard for Fourth Amendment cases, arguing that to do so would "introduce
into qualified immunity analysis a complexity rivaling that which we found sufficiently daunt-
ing to deter us from tailoring the doctrine to the nature of officials' duties or of the rights
allegedly violated." Id. at 645.
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carried continued relevance in shaping the contours of § 1983 liability.'49
Unlike the dissent, however, Justice Kennedy did not visualize the his-
torical analysis as determining a party's entitlement to Harlow immu-
nity.1 °0 Rather, the role of the historical inquiry remained the same as it
had been before Harlow: to provide the court with a model upon which
to pattern the elements of a tort and the defenses thereto under § 1983.1'1
While Lugar appeared to the majority and dissent to determine, for bet-
ter or worse, that good-faith private actors are tortfeasors under
§ 1983,152 Justice Kennedy perceived an opportunity in the Lugar
Court's invitation to construct defenses and immunities to define and set
forth precisely what private party action pursuant to a state statute
should be considered tortious. 153 Justice Kennedy recognized that a
cause of action is not truly delimited by the Court until a determination
is made as to what the plaintiff and defendant must plead and prove re-
spectively in order to prevail. 4 While he agreed that to bestow qualified
immunity upon private actors was improper, Justice Kennedy believed
that it was also unnecessary, given that the Court was acting within the
decision-making authority, to provide details not divulged in Lugar.15
What was not within the Court's proper authority, however, was to
abandon the importance of the common law to § 1983 and focus solely
on Harlow.156 The concurrence thus continued to regard Harlow as the
exception to the proper rule for interpreting § 1983, despite Harlow's
having been applied uniformly to a variety of public officials.157
149. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1834 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1835-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. Although the majority recognized that the Court could (but did not) provide good-
faith and probable-cause defenses to private defendants, or could shift the burden of pleading
or proof on various issues, the Court did not appear to view this power as that of determining
what conduct would be considered a tort under § 1983. Id. at 1834. The split of opinion
among the circuits as to what behavior creates liability attests to the fact that this power was
available to the Court under Lugar.
153. Id. at 1836-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. Justice Kennedy not only claimed that the alternatives available under the common
law were still available after Harlow, he claimed that the Court could not correctly apply
§ 1983 without resorting to them:
[Wie are devising limitations to a remedial statute ... which "on its face does not
provide for any immunities.".. . We have imported common-law doctrines in the
past because of our conclusion that the Congress which enacted § 1983 acted in light
of existing legal principles .... That suggests, however, that we may not transform
what existed at common law based on our notions of policy or efficiency.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)).
157. Justice Kennedy questioned the continued justification for an objectively determined
immunity for public officials in light of the changes in the law of summary judgment under
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Justice Kennedy's concurrence went further than merely rehabilitat-
ing the common-law based immunity of Pierson, Scheuer, and Gomez.
Culling an additional principle from common law-that a citizen's reli-
ance upon the validity of a statute that has not yet been adjudged uncon-
stitutional is reasonableper se-he fashioned a purely subjective standard
for liability to be applied exclusively to Lugar defendants.' Justice
Kennedy based this innovative solution to the problem created in Lugar
upon his perception that common-law defenses did not protect
tortfeasors from liability based on policy, but rather defined what behav-
ior was to be deemed tortious. 5 9 Renouncing the applicability of these
defenses because they are insufficiently related to modem-day immunity
thus inhibits the Court's ability to define "the essence of the wrong.""
The concurrence embraced portions of both the majority and dis-
senting opinions, accepting Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the poli-
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). He explained that the
dangers of unfounded allegations of subjective bad faith are avoided by the new standards at
summary judgment which "allow[ ] summary judgment to be entered against a nonmoving
party 'who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
158. Id. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Birdsall v. Smith, 158 Mich. 390, 394,
122 N.W. 626, 627 (1909)).
159. Justice Kennedy's conceptual distinction between immune action and nontortious ac-
tion is an important one, but at least one commentator argues that this distinction has been
blurred, if not abandoned, in the development of the doctrine of immunity. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 28, § 131, at 1032. Prosser notes:
[Immunities) have come more and more to resemble the case of privilege or justifica-
tion, so that many cases ostensibly decided on immunity may in fact be cases in which
the defendant has not acted tortiously at all, as where a governmental officer is given a
"qualified immunity" and is protected for good faith decision.
Id. (emphasis added). It is perhaps more consistent, therefore, to protect private parties whose
behavior is in good faith with an immunity.
160. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's point again is
well taken. The Court's attempt in conducting its immunity inquiry to find a historical analog
to the § 1983 tort of invoking a valid state statute in good faith illustrates his point. An anal-
ogy between a Wyatt defendant's § 1983 violation and malicious prosecution is inherently de-
fective. Lugar specifically indicated that a private defendant's intentional misapplication of a
statutory procedure would not be state action under § 1983; it would be a private abuse.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 940 (1982). The problem with the analogy is that
it confuses immunity from liability with nontortious conduct. We do not conceptualize the
mere assertion of criminal charges as a tortious act, and then create an immunity from liability
for those who act in good faith. Rather, the malicious and unfounded subjection of another
party to false allegations of criminality is the "essence of the wrong." Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1836
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, the Lugar Court's historical analysis is false to the extent
that it purports to create a tort based upon the common law of tort. A rational argument can
be made that a party who deprives another of his constitutionally guaranteed rights should
compensate the injured party for the loss. Such an argument cannot be properly founded upon
the Court's analogy.
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cies implicated were insufficient to trigger the extraordinary Harlow
immunity, but agreeing with the Chief Justice that the majority had
wrongfully expunged history from its analysis. Justice Kennedy's only
real divergence from both sides lay in his unwillingness to accept the
reflexive logic of a "Harlow or bust" treatment of qualified immunity.
Avoiding this somewhat myopic constraint allowed him to address the
circumstances of a particular class of parties without abandoning a prin-
cipled analysis that takes into account both history and contemporary
policy considerations.
The Wyatt decision correctly overturned the Fifth Circuit's use of
an objective qualified immunity standard for private parties sued under
§ 1983 for invoking statutory procedures that are later held to violate the
constitutional rights of others. Unfortunately, Wyatt left unanswered the
significant questions posed in Lugar. While the holding in Wyatt over-
turns one solution to Lugar adopted by several federal circuits, it per-
petuates a split in opinion among the others.161 The majority's decision
ensures that private parties will not escape liability for bad-faith constitu-
tional violations based upon a finding of objective reasonableness. The
Court wisely found that upholding constitutional protections codified
under § 1983 outweighs the expediency of the summary disposition of
weak claims. But the Wyatt Court's decision does not go far enough.
Lower courts faced with § 1983 private party defendants who relied
upon a constitutionally infirm statute may, under Wyatt, choose to allow
defenses of probable cause or good faith, or both; they may choose to
shift burdens of pleading and burdens of proof between the parties; they
may choose to afford no protections. They must make these choices,
however, without guidance from the United States Supreme Court.
As a result of the Court's decision in Wyatt, Lugar stands, as does
the inconsistent application of § 1983 at the district and appellate levels
of the federal courts. The majority's hedging on the issue of private party
liability under § 1983 is, at best, overly cautious, and, at worst, irrespon-
sible. As the final arbiter of federal law, the Supreme Court bears the
responsibility of defining the parameters of federal statutes, so that one
does not face different rights and liabilities depending upon geography. 162
161. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
162. It should be emphasized that a call for the Court to resolve a four-way split at the
circuit court level in no way denies "the benefit [the Court] receives from permitting several
courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certiorari." United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984). The Court waited 11 years before addressing in
Wyatt the question of private party immunity raised in Lugar. Several circuit courts had con-
fronted the issue. The arguments for and against immunity were thoroughly explored and
developed by both litigants and scholars. Moreover, 11 years of appellate court decisions had
illustrated the practical outcome for the parties under each of four approaches. Justice
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The Court's reticence on the issue of the scope of private party liability
under § 1983 leaves good-faith actors subject to undeserved potential
liability.
Justice Kennedy is correct in his belief that the common law holds
the key to a workable § 1983 immunity standard. Why he would discard
the objective portion from the common-law formula is less clear. There
is no real benefit to be gained from abandoning the objective prong of the
qualified immunity test as articulated in Wood v. Strickland,163 perfunc-
tory though it may be where a private party acts pursuant to a statute.
Because the Court finds the specialization of immunity by tort repug-
nant, retaining both steps of the Wood standard would allow a uniform
application of the immunity to all private defendants without the risk of
further damage to § 1983. Granting the limited, common law-based
qualified immunity would most effectively protect both plaintiffs and de-
fendants. ' Furthermore, awarding good-faith immunity to private par-
ties would signify the Court's recognition of the exceptionality of Harlow
immunity'65 and would affirm the enduring relevance of the historical
inquiry into the scope of § 1983 liability.
Certainly, an individual's rights are impinged whether the agent of
the injury acts in good faith or bad. Moreover, when a citizen unreason-
ably or in bad faith uses the potentially awesome power of the state to
O'Connor herself defined the Court's mission in Wyatt as resolving the split of opinion among
the circuits. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1829. A definitive resolution of this issue by the Court at this
stage could not possibly be viewed as "substantially thwart[ing] the development of [an] im-
portant question[ ] of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue." Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
163. 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
164. Under this approach, a plaintiff could recover under § 1983 if a private party defend-
ant either relied unreasonably upon the constitutionality of a statutory procedure or used the
procedure with knowledge of its constitutional infirmity. The plaintiff could also bring a cause
of action in state court for malicious prosecution or abuse of process if the defendant resorted
to the procedure without a reasonable and good-faith belief in his entitlement to the property
seized, or with the intent to use the procedure for an ulterior purpose, such as to harass the
plaintiff.
165. Consider the following argument: If Wyatt had been decided before Harlow, the his-
torical similarities between Wyatt and Pierson would likely have caused the Court to award
Wyatt the qualified immunity formulated in Pierson. After Harlow, the Court uniformly al-
tered all public official qualified immunity to Harlow immunity. What then would the Court
have done with private parties? Assuming that private parties are not worthy of objective
immunity, the Court would have been forced to choose between retaining the good-faith im-
munity for private defendants or abrogating their immunity entirely. Obviously, it would have
made little sense to eliminate private party immunity merely because the Court had decided
for independent policy reasons to grant a greater immunity to the public official counterparts
of private parties. Most likely, the Court would have retained the Pierson immunity for private
parties. Examined from this perspective, the Wyatt decision is dependent entirely upon an
unfortunate chronology.
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violate another's basic rights, he should be held accountable. To the ex-
tent that a citizen is relying upon the only procedure available to him
under the law to effect his purpose, however, the fault of the injury is not
fairly attributable to him. Rather, fault rests with the legislature or the
enforcing officers. Because the Court has made a policy-driven determi-
nation to exclude public officials from suit under § 1983 in most in-
stances, it does not follow that the sins of an immune legislature should
be visited upon private citizens acting according to its edicts. The just
solution to uncompensated § 1983 plaintiffs is less immunity for those
actually responsible,166 not the judicial scapegoating of an unwitting citi-
zenry obliged to live according to the dictates of the law.
DAVID LAGOS
166. Chief Justice Rehnquist succinctly noted the irony of the true reach of§ 1983 in light
of the different immunity standards for public and private parties:
Our § 1983 jurisprudence has gone very far afield indeed, when it subjects private
parties to greater risk than their public counterparts, despite the fact that § 1983's
historic purpose was "to prevent state officials from using the cloak of their authority
under state law to violate rights protected against state infringement."
Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1840 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 948 (1982)) (alteration in original).
One commentator proposes a qualified immunity for public officials modeled upon the
"civil retroactivity" doctrine, under which an official would be liable for an unconstitutional
act even when such unconstitutionality was not clearly established. Rudovsky, supra note 107,
at 80. Rudovsky would deny liability for retroactive findings of unconstitutionality only where
the decision involved a new legal principle-either a break from precedent or an issue of first
impression. Id at 79. In order to protect the public official who acts in good faith, Rudovsky
argues for indemnification of the official by the government rather than immunity. Id. at 80.
Clearly, this scheme would shift the balance more toward compensating those whose constitu-
tional rights are violated. It would also eliminate the need for plaintiffs to seek out a deep-
pocket private party.
Other solutions offered to allow § 1983 plaintiffs to recover damages include: (1) elimi-
nating immunity for lower level officials by incorporating blanket indemnification and insur-
ance from the government, and (2) instituting a two-tiered qualified immunity system between
lower and upper level government officials. John D. Kirby, Qualified Immunity, 75 CORNELL
L. REv. 462, 485-94 (1990).
